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Abstract
Research Summary: We investigate the international
transfer of managerial know-how by analyzing manager
migration patterns in the setting of international soccer.
We characterize a country's managerial know-how by esti-
mating a stochastic frontier model, which relates the coun-
try's soccer performance to socioeconomic and climatic
conditions. We find evidence of learning-by-hiring in that
hiring a migrant manager hailing from a high know-how
country is beneficial to the destination country's perfor-
mance. Larger cultural distance between the migrant man-
ager and destination country reduces the effectiveness of
learning-by-hiring, but this effect is moderated by the
migrant manager's prior international experience. The
transfer of managerial know-how contributes to the overall
convergence of low-performing versus high-performing
soccer countries.
Managerial Summary: In this study, we ask whether
firms in developing countries, which often suffer from
having low-quality management practices, can improve
their performance by hiring managers from developed
countries, who may implement better management prac-
tices. We investigate this in the context of national soccer
team competition, because this allows us to track the per-
formance of migrant managers very precisely over time.
We find that hiring a migrant manager from a developed
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soccer country improves the performance of the develop-
ing host country. This performance improvement is
smaller when the migrant's country of origin is culturally
very different from the host, but migrant managers with
extensive international experience are able to overcome
this negative effect of cultural distance.
KEYWORD S
cultural distance, international experience, international transfer of
human capital, migration, soccer
1 | INTRODUCTION
The effect of migration on economic performance is subject to an intense academic and public
debate. Since the work of Ottaviano and Peri (2006), a central question in this debate has been
whether the diversity caused by immigrant workers helps or hampers worker productivity. On the
one hand, studies find a positive and significant effect, as diverse immigrants bring new and comple-
mentary knowledge that raises productivity. On the other hand, there is a potential negative effect in
that internal fragmentation increases coordination costs. In sum, however, the positive effect appears
to outweigh the negative effect of migration on worker productivity (Kemeny & Cooke, 2018).
This study aims to identify and estimate how both effects moderate the impact of a migrant
worker on organizational performance. For a clear identification of the positive channel, we need to
estimate the knowledge that a migrant worker brings. We do this in the context of superstars, as star
performers are highly productive and easy to identify. Star performers—for example, a Nobel Prize
winner at a university, a top player on a sports team, or an inventor generating many patents at an
innovative firm—can exert a large impact on an organization. Their mobility in the labor market has
therefore been the subject of many academic studies, which stress that the performance of superstars
depends heavily on the environment in which they work and not just on their own skill level
(Groysberg, Lee, & Nanda, 2008).
Over the past decade, a consensus has emerged in the empirical literature that individual top man-
agers, such as chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers, share the characteristics of
star performers and have a significant influence on firm performance (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003). A
famous quote from management guru Peter Drucker in this respect says that, “the productivity of
work is not the responsibility of the worker, but of the manager” (Drucker, 1980, p. 15). Substantial
empirical evidence has shown that there are indeed significant performance differences across seem-
ingly identical enterprises, and at least part of these differences can be explained by differences in
management practices (Syverson, 2011).
Differences in the quality of management practices that result in productivity differences are not
only observed across firms but also across countries (Bloom, Genakos, Sadun, & Van Reenen,
2012). Country-specific heterogeneity in managerial quality is an important factor in explaining per-
sistent productivity differences across nations. Better management practices are found in countries
with stronger product market competition, weaker primogeniture traditions, and higher levels of edu-
cation (Bloom & van Reenen, 2007). Crucially, it appears that tacit industry knowledge, which is
2 PEETERS ET AL.
instrumental to management practices, is transferable across firms and countries (Bloom, Sadun, &
Van Reenen, 2016; Mostafa & Klepper, 2018; Giorcelli, 2019).
Given the apparent heterogeneity in knowledge transfer, we examine how cultural differences
between the sender and receiver of knowledge may hinder the transfer of managerial knowledge.
Cultural distance, defined as the culture-based factors that impede the flow of information between
the firm and its partners (Kogut & Singh, 1988: Benito and Gripsrud), is also likely to limit effective
knowledge transfer within organizations, as it raises the barriers for understanding other members of
the organization (Simonin, 1999). Knowledge transfer is increasingly difficult when cultures become
more distant, because on top of norms and values, also the way in which communication takes place
differs across cultures (Y. Y. Kim, 1988). Related literature (Dikova & Rao Sahib, 2013) has argued
that international managerial experience can make executives better able to cope with these cultural
differences. Hence, it may moderate the relationship between cultural distance and the transfer of
knowledge.
Our theoretical framework builds upon the knowledge-based view of the firm, which considers
knowledge to be the most critical strategic resource leading to an organization's sustainable competi-
tive advantage (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992). Knowledge that can sustain competitive advan-
tage over time must be valuable, rare, and inimitable (Barney, 1991). Consequently, this type of
knowledge can only be transferred between organizations with some difficulty (Knott, 2003; Peteraf,
1993). Within each firm, some knowledge is specific to the firm as it relates to unique routines and
procedures. As such, it is distinct from general human capital, which can more easily be transferred
between firms (Becker, 1962). Moreover, specific knowledge is often tacit and cannot be codified.
When managerial know-how constitutes specific knowledge that deals with the ability to perform a
task or action, it clearly qualifies as tacit knowledge with the potential to deliver competitive
advantage.
We exploit a unique dataset of employment records for national team soccer managers coupled
with detailed performance data of the national soccer teams they manage. We directly evaluate the
impact of migrants on organizational performance and address an important research gap by identify-
ing specific channels for this impact. The use of soccer data allows us to estimate whether knowledge
is transferred from nation to nation and how this transfer affects team performance. Our analysis adds
to past work, which has addressed changes in soccer success through the moves of players from
developing to developed countries (Berlinschi, Schokkaert, & Swinnen, 2013; Milanovic, 2005), the
existence of local spill-overs (Yamamura, 2009), and the hiring of managers with multicultural back-
grounds in more internationally diverse settings (M. Szymanski, Fitzsimmons, & Danis, 2019).
We propose two central reasons for the importance of this managerial context. First, although
transfer of players' skills is done mostly through learning and training, the knowledge of managers is
more tacit. Second, even if players have learned some tactics in superior leagues, the manager is
responsible for the strategy and organization of the national team, and these strategies require coordi-
nation across various players to be implemented successfully. Furthermore, as most national team
soccer managers are superstars, their international employment record is publicly known and can be
used for the identification of possible hurdles in the international transfer of managerial know-how.
Our methodology establishes how much managers, with an estimated level of nationally obtained
managerial know-how, improve the performance of their destination country. In addition, our frame-
work shows that the cultural distance between a migrant manager and his destination country
decreases the effectiveness of that manager, but this effect can be mitigated by the accumulated inter-
national experience of the migrant manager.
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2 | THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
DEVELOPMENT
As management skills are largely tacit knowledge, we expect the international transfer of such
knowledge to be complicated. Tacit knowledge often transfers through socialization, for example,
through a traditional apprenticeship, where apprentices learn the tacit knowledge needed in their craft
through hands-on experience, rather than from written manuals or textbooks (Nonaka & Takeuchi,
1995). Alternatively, the hiring of a migrant manager can be a means for such an international
knowledge transfer. Similarly, although education supports learning these managerial skills for man-
agers originating from managerially advanced countries, managers may also develop their ability to
transfer this knowledge by accruing working experience abroad.
Organizational knowledge can be created within the organization through training of, and learning
by, employees, or can be acquired externally (Dixon, 1992; Huber, 1991). In most cases, firm-
specific knowledge can best be enhanced by learning and training, whereas sector-specific knowl-
edge generally needs to be obtained from other sources. If sector-specific knowledge is explicit, such
knowledge can be acquired through the transfer of intellectual property rights, but if it is tacit, such
knowledge will typically be transferred through hiring. From a broader perspective, international
business studies have identified four channels to transfer knowledge across countries: (a) through
international acquisitions (e.g., Bresman, Birkinshaw, & Nobel, 1999), (b) through transfers within
the boundaries of multinational enterprises (e.g., Burstein & Monge-Naranjo, 2009), (c) through
knowledge spill-overs from labor mobility across countries (Oettl & Agrawal, 2008; Alvarez, For-
rest, Sanz, & Tena, 2011; Berlinschi et al., 2013; Mostafa & Klepper, 2018), and (d) through interna-
tional learning-by-hiring, the focus of our study.
When knowledge is hidden within a firm, Dosi, Freeman, Richard, and Soete (1988) suggest that
hiring people away from a rival firm is an alternative way of transferring knowledge that is otherwise
immobile. Song, Almeida, and Wu (2003) empirically test how firms can employ learning-by-hiring
to access and build on external knowledge. They study non-U.S. engineers who moved to U.S. firms
and investigate the conditions under which mobility best facilitates interfirm knowledge transfer.
Their results point to the importance of path dependence in hiring, as firms that are stuck in their rou-
tines face greater difficulty in integrating external knowledge. They also show that engineers whose
expertise is different from the firm's existing knowledge base, and who are employed in noncore
technological areas of the new firm, are more likely to transfer knowledge. Furthermore, scholars
have found that tacit and complex specific knowledge, such as technological and marketing knowl-
edge, once successfully transferred, enables multinational firms and their subsidiaries to achieve
superior performance (Delios & Beamish, 2001; Fang, Wade, Delios, & Beamish, 2007; Pisano,
1994). Nevertheless, Groysberg et al. (2008) find negative stock market reactions for firms hiring star
performers, possibly as a result of a winner's curse where firms make excessive offers for successful
hires.
Next, we discuss whether management practices qualify as tacit knowledge that can increase pro-
ductivity and performance. There is ample evidence of improvements to productivity through
improvements in managerial practices. For example, Bloom and van Reenen (2007) surveyed firms
in five developed economies and found that firms employing better management practices are more
productive. Moreover, Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013) find evidence that
implementing better management practices in a randomized experiment at Indian textile firms signifi-
cantly improves firm productivity. Building on these insights, Bloom et al. (2016) argue that man-
agement can be perceived as a technology, which can be transferred between firms and countries.
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Mion, Opromolla, and Sforza (2016) provide a first piece of empirical evidence from Portuguese
firms, which supports this point-of-view. Specifically, they show that firms that hire managers from
competitors with successful export performance to a particular destination country tend to improve
their subsequent export performance to that particular country. Similarly, Giorcelli (2019) finds that
management training provided to Italian managers as part of the U.S. Marshall Plan significantly
improved subsequent firm performance of the Italian firms, which sent managers to the United
States.
Although these studies point to the contribution of management to performance in specific set-
tings and industries, it may be inappropriate to apply management practices uniformly across nations,
or even industries. In addressing this question, Khanna (2014) stresses the importance of context,
claiming that, “[t]rying to apply management practices uniformly across geographies is a fool's
errand, much as we'd like to think otherwise.” Examining cross-country differences, Crossland and
Hambrick (2011) emphasize the role of formal and informal institutions in determining managerial
discretion across nations. More managerial discretion is associated with CEOs having a higher degree
of influence over performance. High discretion countries—characterized by strong scores on
Hofstede's measures of individualism, cultural looseness, and uncertainty tolerance coupled with
strong scores on formal measures of institutions, such as ownership dispersion and employer
flexibility—are especially well suited for dynamic industries in which risky and fast decision making
is important. Although these studies provide convincing evidence that management is (a) a type of
organizational knowledge that matters, (b) institutionally bounded, and (c) transferrable within geo-
graphic boundaries, the question as to what extent tacit managerial skills can be transferred across
vastly different cultural environments remains largely unaddressed.
Recent literature has also explored the effects of human capital practices and a workforce's inter-
national experience on firm performance (K. Y. Kim, Pathak, & Werner, 2015; Morris, Snell, &
Björkman, 2016). Le and Kroll (2017) construct three measures of a CEO's international experience
and show their impact on firm performance. These measures include the length of time a CEO has
worked abroad prior to his appointment at the firm, the number of countries in which a CEO has
worked before his appointment, and the cultural distance between the CEO's former and current place
of work. This measure of cultural distance is based on Hofstede's (2001) four cultural dimension
scores: uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity, and power distance. Drawing upon social
and cognitive learning theories, they hypothesize and find a positive effect of all three CEO
experience-related variables on firm performance. We build on their insights by exploring a fourth
dimension of international experience: the amount of managerial know-how a manager may bring
from abroad. We further extend the analysis of cultural distance by exploring the role of cultural dif-
ferences between a manager's country of origin and his working environment.
In this study, we are interested in how the transfer of managerial know-how through international
hiring leads to a change in organizational performance. As stated, previous studies have examined
executives' international experience as a determinant of firm performance. Instead, our focus is on the
transfer of tacit knowledge, which an executive generates while working abroad. Groysberg et al.
(2008) show that star performers cannot generally transfer their complete individual skills as they
move to another firm, because their performance is contingent on firm-specific skills and capabilities.
In their study of security analysts' performance, star analysts showed an immediate and persistent
decline in performance after moving firms, unless they moved to firms with better firm-specific skills
and capabilities. Hiring firms, however, increased their overall productivity. Huckman and Pisano
(2006) found a similar performance decline among surgeons performing exactly the same operation
in an unfamiliar versus familiar hospital. Likewise, managerial skills can be perceived as
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noncodifiable knowledge that is not only embodied in a single person but also at the organizational
level. Hence, although executive level performance may decline when moving to an organization
with fewer capabilities at the organizational level, the productivity at the organizational level may still
increase due to learning-by-hiring. Our hypothesis thus expects firm-level outcomes to improve, even
when this does not necessarily happen for the performance of the individual manager himself.
Hypothesis (H1). Organizational performance is positively associated with the difference in the
level of managerial know-how between a migrant manager's country of origin and the host country.
The transfer of managerial know-how may also be affected by the cultural distance between the
sender and receiver. Cultural distance has been shown to influence firm performance, especially in
the context of international mergers and acquisitions. The sign of the effect, however, is ambiguous
and many explanations for this contrasting result have been put forward (see, for example, Datta and
Puia [1995] for a negative and Morosini, Shane, and Singh [1998] for a positive effect). Dikova and
Rao Sahib (2013) emphasize the importance of international experience as a moderating factor
explaining the differences in sign. In particular, acquiring firms with more international experience
are better able to cope with cultural differences between the acquiring and the target firm than acquir-
ing firms that lack such experience. For the more experienced firms, cultural distance even has a pos-
itive effect on performance, as there are more opportunities to learn.
In a more similar context to ours, Le and Kroll (2017) find a positive association between the
international experience of a new CEO and firm performance, arguing that exposure to high levels of
cultural distance activates learning and makes a CEO more creative. Culturally distant environments
provide stimuli, which are incongruent with the CEO's existing knowledge base and result in greater
general cognitive competencies. More generally, international experience adds to the knowledge of
an executive and to the amount of knowledge that can be transferred in later positions (Black, Men-
denhall, & Oddou, 1991). However, when conditioning upon managerial experience and opportuni-
ties for learning and transfer of knowledge, cultural distance complicates the transfer of such
knowledge. In particular, cultural differences can lead to communication problems that hinder the
transfer of key concepts (Reus & Lamont, 2009). Having experience in (similar) international envi-
ronments reduces these communication barriers and strengthens the manager's ability to adapt to a
new foreign assignment (Shaffer, Harrison, & Gilley, 1999). We therefore propose the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis (H2a). There is a negative effect of the cultural distance between a migrant manager's
country of origin and the host country on the amount of managerial know-how that the migrant man-
ager can transfer, and hence, on organizational performance.
Hypothesis (H2b). The negative effect of cultural distance on organizational performance is posi-
tively moderated by the accumulated previous international experience of the migrant manager.
Recent work has shown that performance in competitive international soccer is characterized by
unconditional convergence (Krause & Szymanski, 2019). In particular, weaker countries have gradu-
ally caught up with more advanced soccer countries, which may indicate that lower ranked soccer
nations receive a larger boost in performance from importing soccer know-how than slightly more
advanced nations. Moreover, countries performing below their long-run average performance may
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find it easier to increase their performance back to this long-term average level. Given this work, we
also test for conditional (beta) convergence in soccer performance (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1998).
We expect this convergence to occur partly through the transfer of managerial know-how from more
advanced to less advanced countries. More specifically, team performance at the start of a migrant
manager's tenure may be negatively related to the difference in managerial know-how between a
migrant manager's origin and host country. This likely influences the relationship between the latter
variable and the change in organizational performance. Our final hypothesis therefore proposes that
recent team performance at the start of a migrant manager's tenure has a negative mediating effect on
the relationship between the transfer of managerial know-how and organizational performance.
Hypothesis (H3). Relatively higher team performance at the start of a migrant manager's tenure
will be negatively associated with the change in organizational performance during that manager's
tenure.
3 | EMPIRICAL SETTING
We empirically test our hypotheses using a unique dataset on manager migration patterns in interna-
tional men's soccer, which is called football outside the United States. This means we focus on games
and tournaments played between national associations, rather than club teams. The most popular and
prestigious competition at this level is the World Cup, which is held every 4 years and sees the
world's best 32 countries compete. The universe of international soccer is, however, far larger. At this
point, 211 national associations are registered with Fédération International de Football Association
(FIFA), the large majority of which represent independent nations and territories.1 These associations
play approximately 1,000 games among themselves each year. A typical game attracts substantial
attention with thousands of fans visiting the stadium and many more watching it live on television
(TV). In many countries, national team games are among the most watched national TV broadcasts
of all time, showing how the performance of the team can be a source of national pride (or dismay)
and even contributes to nation-building (Depetris-Chauvin, Durante, & Campante, 2018). In our
dataset, we track the historical performance of each national association going back to 1980, or to the
foundation of the association if it was formed after 1980, and continuing up to the end of 2015.
Our analysis of managerial know-how focuses on the role of the national team's manager, who is
sometimes also referred to as the coach. The manager is held responsible for the performance of the
team on the field of play. In this capacity, he performs a wide array of typical managerial functions,
such as personnel selection and motivation, formulating and communicating (operational) strategy in
games, refining worker skills through targeted practice and training, and communicating with outside
stakeholders of the team, most notably through the press. The latter function, in particular, ensures
that the manager is an extremely visible figure, which enables straightforward data collection on per-
sonal and career characteristics through open data sources. Apart from managing the players directly,
the manager also hires and manages a support staff, which executes more specialized functions, such
as communication, fitness, or skill development by position. The manager's role and responsibilities
are therefore largely comparable to those of management in other industries. We highlight the simi-
larities between international soccer and other highly (specialized) labor-intensive sectors with
respect to human resource management, a key component of managerial know-how as conceptual-
ized by Bloom et al. (2016). As managerial know-how crucially involves tacit industry knowledge,
managerial know-how in this setting corresponds with soccer know-how. In line with the arguments
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by Bloom et al. (2016), we find that performance varies widely across countries and therefore we
assume that this (soccer) know-how is country specific.
As argued by Wolfe, Uy, Danis, Saxton, and Usher (2015), sports is a rich testing ground for
international business research. In this case, examining the transfer of managerial know-how in the
setting of international soccer has four distinct advantages. First, capital, in the form of tangible
assets such as training grounds, jerseys, and balls, is a comparatively low-cost input in the production
of international soccer, and international technology differences with respect to capital are relatively
small. Hence, it is unlikely that migrant managers transfer a significant amount of purely technical
knowledge, for example, on how to construct machines or production lines. It is equally unlikely that
managers generate positive spillovers because of their prior network abroad, as may be the case for
export performance (as in Mion et al., 2016). This leaves management practices as the primary com-
ponent of know-how, which may be transferred. We therefore obtain a clean testing ground for the
transfer of managerial know-how, largely unaffected by confounding factors. Second, the public
attention devoted to international soccer allows us to construct a uniquely detailed dataset of input
use, relative performance, managerial careers, and manager personal characteristics. Performance is
frequently observed, providing us with a large number of observations. Moreover, the measurement
of performance is a matter of official record and not a subjective feature, which may depend on the
objectives of owners and other stakeholders. Third, both managerial turnover and international
mobility are typically high, which ensures plenty of variation in the identity and origins of managers
observed for each national team. This aids us in identifying the effect of managerial mobility on per-
formance. Additionally, the variation in relative performance of national associations is considerable
both in the cross section and over time for a given team. Finally, international soccer is a more appro-
priate testing ground than club soccer because the national association is restricted to fielding native
players. As such, there is no scope to improve team performance by attracting better players through
higher payrolls, which is the standard practice in club soccer. For our purposes, this implies that the
arrival of a new manager cannot be accompanied by a hike in player investment, and hence, any pos-
itive effect on performance is more cleanly attributable to the manager, as opposed to being con-
founded by the arrival of better generic human capital in the form of players.
4 | EMPIRICAL METHODS AND DATA GENERATION
4.1 | Estimating soccer know-how through stochastic frontier estimation
We assess a national team's performance through its Elo rating. The Elo rating is constructed as a
weighted average of past game results, where weights are defined by the strength of the opponent
team, the margin of victory, and the importance of the game (Hvattum & Arntzen, 2010). We provide
a detailed explanation of the Elo rating calculation in Appendix. A higher Elo score is associated
with better past performance. According to Peeters (2018), it is also a better predictor of future per-
formance in (international) soccer than the commonly used FIFA ranking (Allan & Moffat, 2014;
Yamamura, 2009). In Table 1, we list the top 20 teams in terms of average Elo rating over our data
period. This overview contains all leading nations in international soccer. The map in the top panel
of Figure 1 further shows that the highest Elo ratings are concentrated in Latin America and Western
Europe, the two regions where soccer has traditionally enjoyed the largest following. The lowest Elo
ratings can be found among African and Asian countries.
Given the zero-sum nature of international soccer competition, countries can only improve their
Elo rating through the decline of others. This contributes to an environment with continuous
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competitive pressure, where it is only feasible to sustain a top Elo rating by employing state-of-the-
art management practices. As such, the Elo rating itself can be thought of as a crude way to measure
how far countries are from the knowledge frontier in terms of soccer management. However, there is
an enormous discrepancy among FIFA's more than 200 member associations in terms of wealth, pop-
ulation, and climate, which are all antecedents of soccer performance. In particular, richer countries
with larger populations and a more moderate climate tend to perform better in international soccer,
ceteris paribus (Gasquez & Royuela, 2016).
To more clearly isolate the effect of soccer know-how from these potentially confounding factors,
we extract estimates of soccer know-how from a stochastic frontier model of the following form:
Eloit = βxXit + δt + uit + εit: ð1Þ
In Equation (1) the dependent variable is the logarithm of the Elo rating of country i at the end of
year t (Elo rating at year end). The vector Xit contains a set of demographic, socioeconomic, and
climatologic variables. We further include year fixed effects, represented by δt. The parameter εit rep-
resents a conventional, normally distributed error term. Finally, the term uit, with uit < 0, is a half-
TABLE 1 Top 20 national associations in terms of average Elo scores over 1980–2015
Rank Association
Average
Elo score
Average know-how
estimate
Average know-how
estimate (population only)
1 Brazil 2,001 0.957 0.925
2 Germany 1,964 0.921 0.937
3 Netherlands 1,937 0.953 0.966
4 Spain 1,932 0.920 0.944
5 Argentina 1,921 0.902 0.948
6 France 1,917 0.906 0.931
7 Italy 1,915 0.916 0.934
8 England 1,914 0.914 0.940
9 Croatia 1,835 0.979 0.971
10 Czech Republic 1,833 0.954 0.958
11 Portugal 1,828 0.950 0.954
12 Denmark 1,810 0.931 0.963
13 Mexico 1,809 0.875 0.877
14 Sweden 1,807 0.927 0.954
15 Uruguay 1,803 0.954 0.970
16 Serbia 1,791 0.960 0.945
17 Russia 1,790 0.896 0.854
18 Romania 1,785 0.956 0.926
19 Colombia 1,765 0.909 0.894
20 Belgium 1,758 0.875 0.937
Note: This table shows the average Elo rating and technology estimates for the top 20 associations in terms of Elo rating over
1980–2015. We exclude currently defunct associations, most notably the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Czechoslovakia, and
Yugoslavia.
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normally distributed parameter, which expresses the distance between country i and the knowledge
frontier at time t (Greene, 2012). Following standard practice in the literature, we transform uit to an
estimate of the country's technical efficiency by taking t^it =E exp − u^itjεitð Þ½ . This measure is scaled
on the interval [0, 1] with higher values indicating that a country is closer to the know-how frontier.
We interpret this construct as an estimate of a country's soccer know-how. Specifically, an estimate
closer to one (the knowledge frontier) indicates that a given country has performed relatively well
given its endowment in terms of demographics, wealth, and climate. We assume that performance
not explained by these covariates is produced through levels of know-how present in the country.
Unlike a fixed effects model, the stochastic frontier allows a country's know-how to evolve over
time. This evolution follows directly from the data and does not require us to assume a rule of motion
or deterministic process for the technology parameter. We use maximum likelihood to estimate Equa-
tion (1) and cluster standard errors for each national association.2 For robustness, we also extract
know-how estimates from similar models using ordinary least squares and quantile regressions.
FIGURE 1 World map of country Elo rating and stochastic frontier estimates full model. In the upper panel, we
map the average Elo rating of each country in the dataset over the sample period. In the lower panel, we map the
average know-how estimate for each country in the sample period. UK mapping colors refer to the figures for
England only
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Estimates from these robustness checks are very similar to our frontier estimation, with correlations
in know-how estimates as high as 0.96.
In Panel A of Table 2, we provide detailed definitions for the variables which enter the specifica-
tion of the frontier model in Equation (1). The vector of explanatory variables contains (a) the loga-
rithm of the country's or territory's population (Population), (b) the logarithm of gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita in current U.S. Dollars (GDP per capita), (c) the logarithm of population
density (Pop. density), (d) the percentage urban population (% Urban pop.), and (e) the average tem-
perature, which enters the model as the absolute difference from 14C, the value considered ideal for
outdoor sport performance (Temp. dif. 14C; Gasquez & Royuela, 2016). We finally include indica-
tor variables denoting a country's past colonizer.
Table 3 holds summary statistics for the corresponding variables. The data run from 1980 to 2015
and contain all 224 national associations, which were members of FIFA during this period. A cursory
view of the summary statistics for the input variables underscores just how heterogeneous the mem-
ber associations are, highlighting the importance of our stochastic frontier model. For example, the
largest recorded population is China at 1.37 billion people, versus an average population of 33.8 mil-
lion, and the smallest associations representing just a few thousand people. Similarly, GDP per capita
of the richest country is more than 2,400 times greater than the poorest country in our sample.
We do not include any measures directly related to a country's soccer tradition (e.g., past national
team results or historic FIFA membership) or direct measures of soccer skills (e.g., average quality
of the players). Although these variables may increase the explanatory power of the regression model
(M. Szymanski et al., 2019), they are arguably alternative proxies for the soccer know-how we aim
to measure through the efficiency parameter. Including them would therefore interfere with the aim
of our analysis.
In Table 4, we present the regression results of the stochastic frontier model. In line with previous
research, we find that countries with larger populations are more likely to achieve a high Elo rating.
Furthermore, richer nations with a relatively more urban population and moderate climate also per-
form better. The effect of population density is not significant. In Table 1, we report the know-how
estimates for the full specification (Column 2) and for a model with only population (Column 3).
Controlling for inputs, Croatia appears to be the most advanced country with respect to soccer know-
how. This is no surprise, as Croatia, a relatively small nation regularly manages to reach the final
rounds of big international tournaments. Clearly, controlling for factors beyond population works
against the (rich) Western European countries. In the bottom panel of Figure 1, we give a more com-
plete overview of the know-how estimates by showing a graphic depiction of the world map of
national know-how levels. This again supports the idea that soccer know-how is highly concentrated
in Europe and South America. When compared with the top panel, the bottom panel shows that con-
trolling for inputs is relatively favorable for African as compared with Asian associations, because
Africa tends to achieve the same level of soccer performance with comparatively lower endowments.
4.2 | Performance of migrant managers in their destination country
To test our hypotheses, we specify a panel fixed effects model of team performance over the tenure
of a manager. We formulate the model as follows:
ΔElomit = βknowΔt^mit + βculΔcultmi + βexpexpmt + βexp× culexpmt ×Δcultmi + βzZmt + βconvElo−mi
+ γi + δt + εmit: ð2Þ
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TABLE 2 Variable definitions for estimation samples
Variable name Variable description Sources
Panel A: Yearly panel dataset for technology estimation model (1)
Elo rating at
year end
Calculated Elo rating for association i after final game of
calendar year t.
Based on eloratings.net and
laenderspiel.cmuck.de
Population* Total population in number of people. Enters in logarithm
scale. Code: SP.POP.TOTL.
World Bank (code refers to
World Bank variable
name)Gross domestic
product per
cap.
Gross domestic product in current U.S. dollar. Enters in
logarithm scale. Code: NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.
Population
density*
People per square kilometer of land area. Enters in logarithm
scale. Code: EN.POP.DNST.
% Urban
population
Urban population as % of total population. Code: SP.URB.
TOTL.IN.ZS.
Temperature
difference
14C
Average temperature in degrees Celsius. Enters as absolute
difference from 14C. Code: TAS.
Colonizer Identifier of former colonizer country. Hand collected
Panel B: Game-level panel for performance estimation model (2)
Elo rating
difference per
game
Elo rating start
tenure
Difference between the Elo rating of association i led by
manager m after the game against association j at time t and
the Elo rating at the start of the tenure of manager m with
team i. We divide this figure by the number of games in
manager m’s tenure up until the game against team j.
Based on eloratings.net and
laenderspiel.cmuck.de
Elo rating of association i led by manager m at the start of the
tenure of manager m with team i.
Manager know-
how
difference
Soccer know-how of the country of origin of manager m
measured over 5 years leading up to the start of manager
m’s tenure minus the know-how level of association i as the
value over 1995–1999. We calculate all measure from the
full model in Equation (1), standardized by subtracting the
minimum know-how over all countries in the year 2000 and
dividing by the standard deviation.
Frontier regression
Cultural
distance
The average of the quadratic difference between association i
and the nationality of manager m scaled by the variance
across four variables: uncertainty avoidance, masculinity,
power distance, and individualism.
hofstede-insights.com
International
experience
Number of years manager m was manager of associations
other than his own prior to joining association i.
national-football-teams.com
footballdatabase.
eutransfermarkt.com
uk.soccerway.com
wikipedia.com
Played
professional
Indicator equals 1 if manager m was a professional football
player before manager career, 0 otherwise.
Played
international
Indicator equals 1 if manager m was selected for his own
national team before manager career, 0 otherwise.
Migrant Indicator equals 1 if manager m has different nationality than
current association i, 0 otherwise.
Note: Starred variables have been split out in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales based on UK statistics office data.
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Here, the dependent variable Δ Elomit is the difference between the Elo rating of association i at
time t and the rating at the start of the tenure of the current manager m, divided by the number of
games played under manager m. In other words, the variable estimates the game-level average
change in Elo over a given manager's tenure at a given association. For Hypothesis H1, our main
interest lies in examining Δt^mit , which measures the difference in managerial know-how of manager
m’s country of origin and the host country i. Specifically, a positive and significant coefficient on the
difference in know-how would lead us to support Hypothesis H1, indicating that importing a man-
ager from a country with more know-how relative to the host country results in improved perfor-
mance. We assess Hypotheses H2a and H2b by including manager m’s international experience in
years prior to joining association i (expmt), the cultural distance between manager m’s country of ori-
gin and association i (Δcultmi), and their interaction (expmt×Δcultmi). Hypothesis H3, referring to
conditional convergence of soccer performance, is tested using the starting value of the host country
at the start of manager m’s tenure (Elo−mi) and comparing this model to those without the starting
Elo rating. Specifically, we hypothesize that importing know-how by hiring a migrant manager is a
mechanism by which convergence of soccer performance can take place. After all, countries may be
TABLE 4 Stochastic frontier regression results
Dependent variable
Elo rating at year end
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population 0.056* 0.056* 0.041* 0.041*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
GDP per capita 0.028* 0.029*
(0.006) (0.007)
Population density −0.001 0.002
(0.007) (0.006)
% Population urban 0.002* 0.001†
(0.000) (0.000)
Temperature difference 14C −0.022† −0.014
(0.011) (0.010)
Constant 6.604* 6.621* 6.570* 6.577*
(0.076) (0.076) (0.104) (0.109)
SD technical efficiency 0.298 0.297 0.242 0.225
SD residual error 0.056 0.056 0.040 0.038
R2 .937 .937 .961 .965
Colonizer FE NO NO NO YES
Year FE NO YES YES YES
Observations 5,783 5,783 4,897 4,897
Note: Table shows results of know-how regression for stochastic frontier regression model. We report the SD of the (half-normal)
technical efficiency estimates and (normal) residual errors. The R2 measure is calculated as 1− Var residual errorð ÞVar Dep:Var:ð Þ . SE are clustered at the
association level and given in parentheses. Significance is denoted as * for .01 level and † for .05 level.
Abbreviations: FE, fixed effects; GDP, gross domestic product.
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more willing to source know-how from abroad when their recent performance has been weak. Hence,
we expect a negative correlation between recent team performance and importing know-how by hir-
ing a migrant manager. In that case, a negative and statistically significant effect of recent perfor-
mance in combination with a weaker effect of know-how transfers on organizational performance
would point to a mediating effect.
The Elo rating explicitly weighs a game by the importance of the competition or tournament
in which it is played and the strength of the opposing team (Hvattum & Arntzen, 2010). As
such, we do not need to distinguish between different tournaments and opponents in our regres-
sion model. To eliminate time invariant team effects and common time factors, we add team
and year fixed effects, represented by the indicator variables γi and δt. The inclusion of these
fixed effects implies that we identify the effect of managerial know-how transfers only exploi-
ting within team performance variation after controlling for time shocks common to all teams.
Through the vector Zmt, we include measures for the quality of manager m’s prior playing
career. This allows us to isolate our findings from the expert leadership effects documented by
Goodall, Kahn, and Oswald (2011) and Goodall and Pogrebna (2015). The last term, εmit,
denotes a game-level error term.
Panel B of Table 1 provides detailed definitions of the variables we include in our estimation
of Equation (2). We derive the know-how difference between the migrant manager and host
country (Manager know-how difference) from the fully specified frontier model of Equation (1).
We standardize the know-how measures by subtracting the lowest knowledge level in the data at
the start of our sample and dividing by the standard deviation. In our baseline results, we fix
the know-how level of the manager's country of origin to the level measured over the 5 years
leading up to the start of the mobility sample in the year 2000. For the destination country, we
look at the average over the 5 years up to the year in which the manager starts his tenure. We
refer to the Supporting Information Appendix for additional results using alternative measures of
know-how.
The variables we use to operationalize Hypothesis H2a and H2b are cultural distance and interna-
tional experience. For cultural distance, we follow the approach of Kogut and Singh (1988), which
was also used by Benito and Gripsrud (1992) to study firm location choice. We thus calculate the
average variance weighted distance across the four cultural dimensions defined by Hofstede (2001)
between migrant manager m’s country of origin and the host association i. As shown by Beugelsdijk,
Maseland, and Van Hoorn (2015), the relative cultural distance between country pairs is stable over
multiple decades, and hence we assume it is constant over our sample period.3 We measure interna-
tional experience as the total number of years the manager has been active outside his country of ori-
gin prior to joining team i. To allow for nonlinear effects of native managers, we further add a
dummy variable to signal whether manager m is a migrant (Migrant) with respect to association i.4
We finally characterize a manager's playing career through two indicator variables, which measure,
respectively, whether a manager (a) played at the professional level (Played professional) and
(b) played for his own national team (Played international).
Our dataset for this analysis contains all international soccer games in the period 2000 through
2015. As shown in Table 5, the data contain 29,520 observations at the game level. As each game
represents two observations, one from each team's perspective, this implies we use 14,760 indepen-
dent games. The average manager has around 1.5 years of international experience. The manager to
host country know-how difference is positive on average, meaning that countries on average (but not
necessarily) hire a manager from a stronger country. In the average game, the cultural distance
between manager and host country stands at 0.93. To illustrate, this figure corresponds to the cultural
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distance between Portugal and its former manager Felipe Scolari, a Brazil native. The largest cultural
distance in the dataset (8.94) is found between Swedish manager Sven-Göran Eriksson and his for-
mer team Mexico. On the other side of the spectrum, the cultural distance equals 0 for 52% of games,
where the coach is native to the country he manages. Almost all managers have been professional
players, as about 60% have played for a national team themselves.
5 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS
To assess Hypothesis H1, we examine the results of the panel model specified in Equation (2),
depicted in Table 6. We start from a model including only control variables, and then add the vari-
ables of interest step-by-step. In Column 1, we find that hiring a migrant manager in itself has an
insignificant impact on performance. This result is similar to M. Szymanski et al. (2019), although
they find an insignificant negative instead of a positive coefficient. According to the results in Col-
umn 2, however, migrant managers from countries with a higher know-how advantage over the desti-
nation country have a more positive impact on national team performance. This positive and
significant moderating effect is robust to (a) the inclusion of the other variables of interest in Col-
umns 3 and 4, (b) switching to (raw) Elo as an alternative measure of know-how (see Supporting
Information Appendix Table A2), and (c) controlling for the know-how level of the previous man-
ager (see Supporting Information Appendix Table A3). Hence, these results lead us to support
Hypothesis H1.
To assess Hypothesis H2a, we examine the separate effect of cultural distance and interna-
tional experience in Column 3 of Table 6. Our results show a significantly negative coefficient
for the cultural distance variable. Hence, we find that larger cultural distance between the
migrant manager's home country and the host country hampers organizational performance. This
effect is robust across almost all alternative specifications we test, including those reported in
Supporting Information Appendix Table A2 (where we use difference in raw Elo instead of dif-
ferences in estimated know-how from the stochastic frontier model) and Table A3 (where we
control for characteristics of the predecessor of the manager). We interpret this result as empiri-
cal support for Hypothesis H2a. Our estimate for international experience, however, is insignifi-
cant in the specification of Column 3. In other words, having more international experience in
itself has no significant effect on performance.
We investigate Hypothesis H2b by including the interaction between international experience
and cultural distance in the regression model in Column 4 of Table 6. As the moderating term is pos-
itive and significant, it is clear that the effects of international experience and cultural distance on
organizational performance are intertwined. To allow for a clearer interpretation, we provide a
graphic representation of the combined effect of both variables in Figure 2. The top panel depicts the
marginal effect of cultural distance (with 95% confidence interval) over the relevant range of interna-
tional experience. It is clear that cultural distance has significant negative consequences for managers
without any international experience. As a manager accumulates more international experience, cul-
tural distance has progressively less impact on organizational performance. For managers with more
than 3 years of international experience, the effect of cultural distance is no longer significantly neg-
ative. The lower panel shows the average effect of an additional year of international experience for
a representative range of values for cultural distance. For managers who have to bridge a large cul-
tural distance, an additional year of international experience has a significantly positive impact on
organizational performance. As cultural distance diminishes, the importance of international experi-
ence also decreases. For managers in countries with very similar cultures (cultural distance below 2),
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the impact of international experience even becomes slightly negative. In other words, we find that
international experience only has an effect on performance through its moderating effect on the detri-
mental impact of cultural distance. We interpret this as a refinement of the findings of Le and Kroll
(2017) that international experience is positively related to organizational performance. Overall, our
results lend clear empirical support for Hypothesis H2b.
TABLE 6 Results panel regression Hypotheses H1, H2a, H2b, and H3
Dependent variable
Difference in Elo rating since start manager tenure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Manager know-how difference (H1) 1.178* 1.167* 1.172* −0.014
(0.245) (0.240) (0.238) (0.236)
International experience 0.008 −0.106‡ −0.105‡
(0.0340) (0.0624) (0.0587)
Cultural distance (H2a) −0.294† −0.457* −0.254‡
(0.122) (0.145) (0.130)
International experience × cultural distance
(H2b)
0.061† 0.044‡
(0.0265) (0.0244)
Further controls
Migrant 0.102 −0.604 −0.017 0.232 0.701
(0.343) (0.392) (0.498) (0.511) (0.474)
Played professional 0.557 0.450 0.457 0.426 0.531
(0.391) (0.375) (0.367) (0.369) (0.340)
Played international 0.262 0.313 0.287 0.290 0.065
(0.307) (0.303) (0.299) (0.298) (0.253)
Elo start tenure (H3) −0.027*
(0.002)
Constant −0.101 −0.106 −0.107 −0.101 41.84*
(0.454) (0.452) (0.449) (0.449) (3.496)
Observations 24,024 24,024 24,024 24,024 24,024
Within R2 .003 .012 .014 .016 .076
Teams 169 169 169 169 169
Team FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table shows panel regression results for the performance of an association over a manager's tenure as a function of the
difference in know-how between the association and the country of origin of the current manager. Know-how of the manager's source
country is calculated as the standardized 5-year rolling average leading up to the start of the sample period in 2000. For the destination
country, know-how refers to the average over 5 years leading up to the start of the manager's tenure. In Columns 3–5, we add
measures of the manager's international experience and the cultural distance between the manager's country of origin and the current
association. These regressions further control for the manager's prior playing experience, whether he is a migrant and whether there
was home advantage present in the game. In Column 5, we furthermore test explicitly for convergence by including the Elo level
at the start of employment. All models include year and team fixed effects. SE are clustered at team level and given in parentheses.
R2 numbers refer to within team R-squared. Significance is denoted as * for .01 level, † for .05 level, and ‡ for .1 level.
Abbreviations: FE, Fixed Effects.
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To address Hypothesis H3, we finally include the host country's Elo rating at the start of the man-
ager's tenure as an explicit control for conditional convergence. Table 5 shows that the correlation
between the manager know-how difference and Elo rating at the start of his tenure is −0.49, and sig-
nificant indeed. When this variable is included in Column 5, the estimated effect of the migrant man-
ager country's know-how is no longer statistically significant. Combined with the significance of the
initial Elo rating, this implies that the initial performance level is a mediator for the relationship
between manager know-how difference and organizational performance. So, countries with relatively
low performance catch up when hiring a migrant manager from a high know-how source country. In
this context, our results complement the analysis of Krause and Szymanski (2019), who find conver-
gence in international soccer performances across countries. The transfer of managerial know-how
we explicitly model here is one of the potential mechanisms they propose to explain this conver-
gence. Our results support that the import of know-how through a migrant manager is a channel
through which countries converge. We therefore have evidence to support Hypothesis H3.
FIGURE 2 Marginal
effect of international
experience and cultural
distance. In the upper panel,
we show the average
marginal effect of cultural
distance as a function of
international experience
measured in years. In the
bottom panel, we plot the
average marginal effect of
international experience as a
function of cultural distance
between the manager's
nationality and host country.
The whiskers depict 95%
confidence intervals, taking
the relevant interaction
effects into account
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Finally, we briefly focus on the other control variables in Table 6. It appears that those managers
who were better players (played professionally and for their respective national team) tend to perform
better, although these control variables are not statistically significant in our models. As such, our
results do not explicitly support the expert leader hypothesis as found by Goodall et al. (2011) and
Goodall and Pogrebna (2015).
6 | DISCUSSION, MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS, AND
LIMITATIONS
Given the rising international mobility of high-skilled professionals, such as university professors,
artists, athletes, and top managers, the scope for productivity gains from migration seems destined to
grow over the coming years. Today, few top organizations rely on home-grown talent to fill their
managerial positions and often need to turn to external sources. Recognizing this, government policy
in developed countries often tends to encourage high-skilled migration (e.g., the EU's Marie Curie
grant program for promising researchers). This may be changing, however, as most Western coun-
tries have recently witnessed the rise of political forces which strongly oppose migration
(e.g., Donald Trump in the United States, Lega in Italy, and Rassemblement National, the former
Front National, in France). Likewise, developing countries often create barriers to entry for foreign
firms and workers to access local markets and resources (Burstein & Monge-Naranjo, 2009).
Given the clear positive performance effects we uncover for managers originating from countries
with advanced managerial know-how, policies to attract workers from more advanced countries con-
stitute a promising strategy for poorer countries seeking to catch up to their richer counterparts. This
international mobility not only leads to the transfer of tacit knowledge but also allows workers to
build international experience, which in turn enables them to better cope with cultural differences that
may hinder the transfer of skills to future employers.
Our results shed light on recent literature on the knowledge-based view in international business
by examining to what extent and how superstar workers can transfer knowledge to new employers,
what a potential obstacle to this transfer is, and how this obstacle can be overcome. As the amount of
tacit knowledge that a worker carries is normally unknown, studies on the transfer of management
know-how have been confined to standard management practices without variation in the amount of
knowledge. Our results imply that managers are indeed able to transfer managerial know-how across
borders. Human resource policy should especially focus on workers from high performing places, as
workers tend to absorb know-how and bring it with them. Moreover, cultural barriers may hinder the
transfer of knowledge, but this effect decreases with the worker's international experience.
Inevitably, our research suffers from some limitations. First, we do not observe individual man-
ager know-how, but instead proxy this through the manager's country of origin. Hence, we assume
that all managers originating from the same country are exposed to the same knowledge prior to their
international experiences. Of course, managers may differ in the effective exposure to high-end
know-how they have enjoyed in their home country. However, the high-profile character of the job
of a national team coach diminishes the chance of bias resulting from this assumption. After all, the
press and public would never accept the appointment of an inexperienced, low-profile migrant coach
as national team manager. This greatly diminishes the probability that individuals who are far
removed from the highest level of soccer know-how in their country of origin get selected to manage
a foreign national team.
Second, the shortcomings of Hofstede's measures of cultural distance are widely acknowledged
and alternatives for these measures are proposed (e.g., Shenkar, 2001). It is beyond the scope of our
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analysis to contribute to this ongoing debate, but we do suggest additional inquiry into the existence
of similar moderating effects using other measures.
Third, the hiring of a foreign coach may be endogenous, as such a hire may take place under spe-
cial circumstances. By looking at the difference in Elo, instead of the level, we try to control for these
circumstances, but we cannot identify the exact reasons why a foreign coach was hired. In the
Supporting Information Appendix, we presented a set of robustness checks, which explicitly include
measures pertaining to the predecessor of the migrant coach. These support our baseline results.
Finally, as noted in S. Szymanski (2014), the convergence of national soccer team quality—in this
case through the import of managerial know-how—may differ from convergence in other industries.
Nevertheless, the apparent knowledge transfer taking place in this industry is likely relevant for other
industries with similar levels of cross-border interaction and substantial managerial migration and
relocation throughout the career span. Moreover, the propensity for cross-border interaction in other
industries is likely to continue its growth as economies across the globe become ever more
intertwined.
7 | CONCLUSION
Our work tests the transfer of managerial know-how across international borders using the context of
international soccer, where manager experience and team (firm) performance are well recorded. Our
estimations show that migrant managers from high know-how countries improve the performance of
their destination country's team. Although cultural distance between a manager and the destination
country hinders the effectiveness of that manager, this effect is mitigated when the manager has high
levels of international experience. Finally, we find that this international know-how transfer is a
channel contributing to the overall convergence of poor and strong performing countries in national
team soccer. Although we set our empirical work within the context of international soccer competi-
tion, we propose that migrant managers may similarly transfer tacit managerial know-how in other
industries. We therefore call for supporting empirical work based on high-quality data sets in other
industries of interest.
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ENDNOTES
1 One exception is the United Kingdom, which fields separate teams for England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern
Ireland.
2 We present the results of these alternative estimations in the Supporting Information Appendix Table A1.
3 See Dow, Baack, and Parente (in press) for an updated discussion of the measurement of cultural distance.
4 We attempted to collect language skills for each manager, but this turned out impossible to find from reliable
sources.
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APPENDIX
PROCEDURE FOR ELO RATING CALCULATION
The Elo rating uses past game outcomes to establish a win expectancy for each team for an upcoming
game. The measure is updated after each game based on the outcome, score differential, opponent
quality, and level of play. If a team beats a high-quality team, as measured by Elo, they are more
highly rewarded, whereas a loss to a lower ranked team results in a larger number of Elo ratings
points lost.
We adopt the formulas developed by World Football Elo Ratings (www.eloratings.net), but calcu-
late our own ratings from our sample of games. To increase robustness, we calculate multiple ver-
sions of the Elo rating. First, we base our estimates on initialized values in 2000 from the World
Football Elo Ratings website and train our data through 2015. We also calculate our own version of
Elo rating using historical games starting in 1930. For both versions, we calculate ratings separately
with and without friendly matches included. Ratings are largely consistent across calculations, and
we use the World Football initialized ratings with friendly matches included for the empirical analy-
sis presented in the main article.
Each country's rating is calculated dynamically across the season as follows:
Eloi, t =Eloi, t−1 +K*ij Wij−Pr Wij =1
  
Here, t indexes the current game, whereas t − 1 identifies the state after the previous game. The
term Wij represents the result of the game against team j such that,
Wij =
1 if team iwins
0:5 for a draw
0 if team i loses
8><
>:
Pr[Wij = 1] is the Elo-based expected win probability for team i against team j given by:
Pr Wij =1
 
=
1
10−Elodiff ij=400 + 1
where,
Elodiff ij =Eloi, t−1−Eloj, t−1 + 100 I i=Home½ ð Þ
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Home team advantage is entered as a constant Elo difference of 100 added to the actual Elo differ-
ence between the competing teams. For games played on neutral ground, no adjustment is made, as
the indicator function, I(), is equal to zero in this case.
Finally, the term K*ij is a parameter adjusted for the goal difference in each game and weighted by
the level of play. Following the World Football Elo classifications, we consider five levels of play:
K = 60 for World Cup finals, K = 50 for continental championship finals and major intercontinental
tournaments, K = 40 for qualifiers of each of these tournament, K = 30 for all other tournaments,
and, lastly, K = 20 for a friendly match. These weights are then adjusted depending on |dij|, the abso-
lute value of the score difference in the game between teams i and j. A larger number of points is
reallocated to the winning team (and taken from the losing team) if the score margin is higher. As
such, we calculate the parameter, K*ij as follows:
K*ij =
K if dij
 ≤ 1
1:5 Kð Þ if dij
 =2
1:75 Kð Þ if dij
 =3
1:75+
dij
 −3
8
 
Kð Þ if dij
 >3
8>>><
>>>:
As some new countries began their international competition after our 2000 start date for Elo rat-
ing calculation, we enter the Elo rating chosen by World Football Elo as a starting value in our data.
For robustness, we also use a starting value of the average in the dataset, finding few differences
overall in our data. Across all calculations, Elo ratings were largely similar in rank. At the individual
game level, ratings ranged from a minimum of 461 to a maximum of 2,212, with a maximum differ-
ence in Elo of 1,231.
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